JAMES SUFFRIDGE'S ELECTION AS SECRETARY-TREASURER, 1944
Scope and Content Note: Meyers ran his campaign. In exchange for the vote of Joe DeSilva's 5,000-member local in Los Angeles, Meyers offered him a general charter, rather than the food charter he held, and twenty thousand dollars to pay department store organizers. DeSilva agreed and turned out his local 100 percent for Suffridge. Anecdote about Joe DeSilva teaching members how to picket.

ORGANIZING SAN DIEGO (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW's Max Osslo ran RCIA organizers out of town. His excuse was that former RCIA President W.G. Desepte had given him permission to organize San Diego clerks in exchange for payment of the expenses involved, but he never organized anyone. About a year before Suffridge was elected secretary-treasurer, the RCIA sent an organizer from DeSilva's staff down to organize San Diego. He was paid sixty-five dollars a week, but never organized anyone, because Osslo had threatened him. Anecdote about John Fonner doing a “survey” as a method of getting a mailing list of San Diego clerks and testing their union sentiment. Meyers then set up office in San Diego and used four of DeSilva's men to sign up members based on the list compiled by Fonner. Osslo then filed for a National Labor Relations Board {NLRB) election. This resulted in a long delay. Because many of the clerks were married to servicemen stationed in San Diego who were continually being shipped out, Meyers had to keep organizing over and over in order to maintain his majority. In order to break the stalemate, Meyers invited Safeway management to a meeting of the California Council of Clerks and threatened to close every Safeway store in California if the company did not recognize the RCIA in San Diego. Whether it would have been legal to pull all the clerks out at this time was irrelevant, since Safeway knew the threat was real and signed the recognition agreement.

ANECDOTE ABOUT HOW LEGALITIES CAN BE OVERCOME IF THE UNION HAS PLENTY OF STRENGTH
Scope and Content Note: The clerks in southern Illinois were fully organized, but they were overly modest in their contract demands. Meyers arrived during one set of negotiations, and threatened a strike. The management representative said they could not strike because they had not given the proper notice.

CONTINUATION OF ANECDOTE ABOUT OVERCOMING LEGALITIES
Scope and Content Note: Meyers took a recess from negotiations and called the RCIA legal department. The attorney said if the strike could be won, go ahead and call it, and “we'll litigate for three years.” The strike was settled in a week.

CONTINUATION OF DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZING SAN DIEGO (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: The recognition signed by Safeway was of little use because legally the company was prevented from signing a contract. Furthermore, since it was World War II, a strike would merely have brought in the government. Thus, the litigation continued. Finally, the Safeway election was held. Meyers knew the RCIA would win big, so he called in Suffridge to gain some publicity. AMC&BW's Pat Gorman, however, prevented the victorious balloting counting by getting an injunction to stall the count based on the claim that elections in other chains were pending, and the results of this election might prejudice the other elections. About a month later, all ballots were counted, and the AMC&BW received less than 10 percent. Meyers thought all was well now, but Osslo did not give up. When Meyers tried to organize some big independent supermarkets, Osslo had his meat cutters picket or refuse to cut meat. Meyers counter-attacked by picketing a meat market. Osslo sent a physical threat to Meyers, and Meyers called him on it. Eventually, Osslo gave in and even turned over to the RCIA the few clerks he had in exchange for what it had cost to organize them.

THE SECOND FIGHT WITH MAX OSSLO
Scope and Content Note: The issue was jurisdiction over frozen food. Osslo borrowed some goons from Harry Lundeberg, President of the Seafarers' International Union. The goons broke the back of one of RCIA's organizers, and the RCIA pressed charges against Osslo. He served six months of a five-year term and was released through RCIA intervention as a gesture toward unity with the AMC&BW. Osslo spent a lot of Meat Cutters' money in his unsuccessful fights with the Clerks and yet was made an AMC&BW vice-president. “It seems like some Internationals have a talent for rewarding their failures.” After Osslo's release from prison, the RCIA and the AMC&BW had a pretty good relationship in San Diego.^[1]

JOHN FONNER, WHO BEGAN IT ALL IN SAN DIEGO, WENT ON TO BECOME A GOOD BUSINESS AGENT F0R RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Meyers doubts an open campaign against Osslo would have been as successful an approach as the survey approach was as a means of entering San Diego.

MORE ON SAN DIEGO - THE TURNING POINT (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: At an American Federation of Labor (AFL) convention, President William Green appointed Reuben Soderstrum, President of the Illinois State Federation of Labor, to try to conciliate the RCIA and the AMC&BW. Meyers told Pat Gorman that the backbone of the Clerks in California had always been the store managers, but the NLRB now ruled that managers were ineligible in elections; thus, RCIA wanted to avoid elections, but Osslo was forcing one. Gorman responded that he would give Safeway all its managers if Safeway would give him all its clerks. Soderstrum told Meyers he was in the right, but the local labor paper in San Diego, virtually controlled by Osslo, reported that Soderstrum had ruled against the clerks. Meyers seized upon this and sent several copies of the paper to Soderstrum, encouraging him to respond to it. Soderstrum did respond with a blistering letter to Osslo which Meyers reproduced in large quantities. After that, the road through the elections was much easier.

RCIA - AMC&BW RELATIONS
Scope and Content Note: Outside of San Diego, the two unions had good relations in the West. In the East, however, relations were much worse.

RCIA - AMC&BW, PHILADELPHIA
Scope and Content Note: The Meat Cutters, led by Harry Poole, had signed up half the clerks in the area before Meyers, as Eastern Director, even heard about it. The local RCIA leader, who was lazy and possibly corrupt, told Meyers not to worry about it because he was a friend of Poole and would straighten it out. Meyers called Poole but was unable to get him to call off the raid. Meyers borrowed from Jim Housewright the people they had used in cleaning up Cleveland (see “Recollections” and Tape 6, Side 2, and Tape 7, Side 1). The RCIA had special blue envelopes for organizers' use in communicating with the International. Since the local membership had been neglected by the local leadership, Meyers had these blue envelopes distributed to the members and told them to send their grievances directly to the International. The avalanche of blue envelopes upset RCIA President Vernon Housewright, but the tactic was successful; the election was won by a substantial majority because Meyers had repudiated the local officers.

STRAIGHTENING OUT BALTIMORE (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: The local Food Fair management would offer only a dollar increase at each negotiation. If the local objected, management threatened to help the Meat Cutters sign up its members.

CONTINUATION OF THE BALTIMORE STORY (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Organizer Tom Best, who had the trust of the workers, told Meyers about the situation, and Meyer told him to keep an eye on it and call when the Food Fair management again tried to play the Meat Cutters against the Clerks. When Best so reported, Meyers called a mass meeting and told the members the International would back them to the hilt in giving them their union back (from a leadership which was playing ball with management) and in helping them with negotiations. Murray Plopper was now Eastern Director, and the situation was left in his hands. He complained Meyers had promised more than could be delivered in one series of negotiations. Meyers had to come in and calm down the membership.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RCIA EAST AND WEST
Scope and Content Note: Fresh, enthusiastic and militant in the West with “no time to become corrupt.” When Meyers was assigned as Eastern Director, he was forced to engage in a complete renovation. Almost every local was forced to an election by the Meat Cutters.

WILKES-BARRE, PENNSYLVANIA: ORGANIZING FROM SCRATCH IN COMPETITION WITH THE AMC&BW
Scope and Content Note: Meyers filed for an NLRB election, covering clerks, but Harry Poole filed for a total unit of both clerks and meat cutters. Unfortunately, a man who had been a manager and good RCIA member in Oakland was now a manager in this area. Unbeknownst to Meyers, this man signed up his whole A & P store for the RCIA. This was a violation of NLRB rules, and the Meat Cutters preferred charges after the RCIA election victory. Meyers called nine mass meetings and blamed the Meat Cutters for delaying things; he created “almost a lynch spirit against the Meat Cutters.” Meyers decided not to contest the technicality but to go ahead and have another election. On the day for counting the ballots, he offered Poole a truce suggesting that the ballots not be counted but simply splitting up the unit with 400 butchers going to AMC&BW and 1,800 clerks going to RCIA. Poole refused, and the RCIA won the total unit and has kept it ever since.

AFL-CIO FOOD AND BEVERAGE TRADES DEPARTMENT
Scope and Content Note: Harry Poole was president of the department. Meyers complained that the RCIA was paying per capita to this department while its president was traveling the country raiding the RCIA. Meyers recruited delegates from all kinds of unions, brought them to department meetings and openly destroyed the department. When the department was revised later on, the two unions were talking merger, and Jim Housewright was made president of the department.

MEYERS BITTERLY RESENTED THE PERIOD OF AMC&BW RAIDS WHILE HE WAS EASTERN DIRECTOR
Scope and Content Note: His interest was in department stores, but he was unable to pursue their organization because his prime concern had to be defense of existing food store organization. AMC&BW raids also distracted from the organization of the new discount stores.

MACY'S STRIKE IN TOLEDO
Scope and Content Note: This was Hoffa's revenge on the RCIA for cleaning up Detroit. He enticed the local officers and Division Director Jim Housewright to go on strike and then deserted the situation two days later.

MORE ON MACY'S, TOLEDO STRIKE
Scope and Content Note: The Teamsters had encouraged the strike and had promised to support it, but then turned around and put out back-to-work literature. Suffridge assigned Meyers to work on the situation. The job of getting the people back to work with their seniority took 13 months.

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS (ACW) SWEETHEART C0NTRACT WITH A DISCOUNT STORE IN TOLEDO
Scope and Content Note: An ACW Detroit local leader signed a contract with a proposed 250-employee discount store in Toledo, the Family Fair Discount Store. This was during the Macy's strike. Meyers told the store's representative, a Mr. Hughes, that he would never be able to open the store with an ACW sweetheart contract in a labor town like Toledo because the RCIA would picket. The alternative was to permit the RCIA to openly sign up the employees and to negotiate a contract with a committee of employees. RCIA proceeded to sign up a majority.

SUBSEQUENT RELATIONS WITH FAMILY FAIR DISCOUNT
Scope and Content Note: In negotiations a week after the store opened, the vice-president of the chain asked why these employees hired at minimum wage, should now be worth 25 to 75 cents an hour more. Meyers replied that it was simply a difference between telling people what they were worth and consulting with them on the matter. An agreement was signed, and Meyers went on to get friendly with Hughes. Hughes confessed he had been a radical earlier in life, and had had his head cracked on a picket line and had finally gotten smart and become an employers' representative. However, he was still sympathetic to labor. Hughes informed Meyers the chain was preparing to open 13 more stores on the East Coast. Eventually, the chain had 1OO stores, and the RCIA organized every one of them. That started RCIA in discount stores.

DIFFICULTIES ORGANIZING DISCOUNT STORES
Scope and Content Note: Zayre discount stores and others like them, either with underworld financing or other big capital, have resisted organization to this day. Many big department stores and dime stores began to adopt discount-store sales methods. RCIA was able to organize them only in towns where the union was already strong. Thus, the organization of the major department and discount stores is still in our future.

THE MAY COMPANY
Scope and Content Note: “The May Company remains today, in my opinion, our chief enemy.” It operates under different names in different places. The strike won against the May Company in Denver was liquidated when the store combined with another and also, because Colorado's requirement of a 75 percent vote of all employees in the unit in order to get a union shop is almost impossible to achieve.

THE STATE OF DISCOUNT-STORE ORGANIZATION TODAY
Scope and Content Note: A “minor percentage” are organized. Many of the stores Meyers organized have gone out of business. “Three Guys,” which was financed by underworld money, was organized by RCIA, but it went bankrupt.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DISCOUNT STORES AND SUPERMARKETS
Scope and Content Note: In terms of getting a contract, supermarkets' products are perishable and potential losses during a strike are great. In a discount store, the merchandise can be put on sale and the capital investment recouped. In terms of initial organizing, employees in discount stores are the least skilled who ordinarily would be working for the minimum wage in any case. Supermarket clerks, on the other hand, are generally much more skilled. “Checkers” are not just checkers; they are “clerks,” and are responsible for a wide variety of duties. Comparison of conditions between organized and unorganized stores. The personal relationship between clerks and customers. RCIA encourages this relationship in order to develop public support for strikes, and customer respect for picket lines.

ANECDOTE ABOUT ACME STRIKE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., IN LATE 1930s
Scope and Content Note: Management had a banquet for scabs and strikers broke into the banquet and ate the food. These strikers have since built a big, successful union.

MORE ON THE DIFFICULTY OF ORGANIZING DISCOUNT STORES
Scope and Content Note: By and large, the employees lack the ability and self-esteem to resist management's blandishments.

DENVER MAY COMPANY STRIKE, 1947
Scope and Content Note: A virtual civil war. Eight-month strike. At one point, all grocery clerks were on strike in addition to the May Company. Meyers spent the equivalent of the International treasury on this strike.

RCIA SPENT CLOSE TO TWO MILLION DOLLARS ORGANIZING WOODWARD AND LOTHROP DEPARTMENT STORES IN WASHINGTON, D.C. RECENTLY
Scope and Content Note: It was considered at one time to be an impossible job, but the International has grown to the point where it can match “big money.”

MANAGEMENT'S ADVANTAGES - THE NATHAN SHEFFERMAN AFFAIR
Scope and Content Note: Sears' anti-unionist, Nathan Shefferman, was denounced by the McClellan Committee; but when the Sears vice-president who hired and paid Shefferman admitted to the Committee it had been a mistake and Sears would never again do such a thing, the Committee gave him high praise. Sears, however, went right out and employed even more sophisticated anti-union tactics.

THE CHANGE IN NLRB WROUGHT BY THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
Scope and Content Note: Prior to Eisenhower's election, regional NLRB personnel had the authority to make decisions. When Eisenhower became President, however, these same people had to consult with the NLRB in Washington to get approval for their decisions.

ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE EASTERN MARYLAND
Scope and Content Note: A “fascist” Ku Klux Klan area. Meyers sent in good organizers to organize Acme Food Stores. Brutal management opposition; Acme's labor relations man was an ex-FBI agent. Organizers were beaten up. Meyers filed an extremely strong complaint with the NLRB which stated the union should be given the chain because the atmosphere had been so poisoned by Acme's anti-union tactics. An NLRB man was sent to investigate, and he was beaten up after taking evidence in an employee's home. Meyers thought he had an open and shut case. Meanwhile, Western Director John Philpott was sent to Washington to look for a building for International headquarters. Meyers had to leave for the AFL convention for two weeks. Upon his return, Philpott announced he had settled the situation by getting a gentleman's agreement that management would no longer interfere. “I could have cut my throat.” Out West, a gentleman's agreement was a firm agreement, but this was a different situation. On the day of the election, voting was done in the presence of supervisors while organizers were chased out of the stores, and the election was lost. Four or five years later, however, Al Akman of the Baltimore local threw a virtual army of organizers into the area and won bargaining rights in those stores.

WHY RCIA AND AMC&BW COULD NEVER GET A JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENT THAT WORKED
Scope and Content Note: The main reason was the AMC&BW was not a unified organization. Gorman really could not tell his strong locals what to do. Thus, even if Gorman had wanted to maintain an agreement, he would not have been able to enforce it.

RCIA - AMC&BC MERGER
Scope and Content Note: Meyers feels one of the biggest inducements for merger was that many of AMC&BW's “old characters” liked the RCIA pension and were ready to retire. Despite the motives, however, the result was good.

MORE ON RCIA -AMC&BW JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS
Scope and Content Note: RCIA could make an agreement and keep it, but AMC&BW could not.

RCIA/AMC&BW - PITTSBURGH
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW had more food clerks in Pittsburgh than RCIA did. The reason is the people who originally organized the A & P clerks had approached C.C. Coulter saying they could organize the clerks for one thousand dollars. He refused. When they approached Gorman, he gave them two thousand dollars. Poole raided RCIA for two independent chains in Pittsburgh. The raid brought Meyers' attention to the fact that there were many part-time employees in those stores who were not included in the contract. Thus, when RCIA won the election, it ended up with twice as many members as before the raid.

RCIA/AMC&BW - BUFFALO
Scope and Content Note: A week after Meyers was assigned to the Eastern Region, he learned Sam Talarico (recently retired United Food and Commercial Workers Union Secretary-Treasurer) was raiding an RCIA unit of 600 A & P employees. Meyers immediately brought in organizers and won the election. Talarico did not even show enough support to justify the election.

WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SAN DIEGO, AMC&BW RAIDING OF RCIA WAS CONFINED TO THE EAST
Scope and Content Note: In the East, “it was largely due to the rottenness of both organizations.” There were exceptions to the rule of rottenness, like John Haletsky in Reading, Pennsylvania. The corrupt leaders were the old ones who were entrenched. The Western RCIA leaders were young and had not learned any tricks, though lately there have been some problems with some larger locals.

RCIA PENSION PLAN
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge wanted a pension plan for officers as early as 1947. Meyers opposed it on the grounds that the members did not yet have pension plans. A compromise was reached - a year or two for study and then submission of the plan to a referendum vote of the membership.

RCIA/AMC&BW MERGER TALKS
Scope and Content Note: Only got serious after Housewright was elected to head the RCIA, and Gorman was getting ready to retire from the AMC&BW. Automation was preventing AMC&BW growth, except through merger. The talks took a long time; Gorman was probably putting up roadblocks. One problem was the opposite relationships the two unions had with the Teamsters.

MORE ON RCIA/AMC&BW MERGER
Scope and Content Note: Meyers cautioned that the AMC&BW was not a union that could organize new members whereas the RCIA was an organizing union.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON AND THE RETAIL CLERKS
Scope and Content Note: Harrington interviewed Meyers extensively for The Retail Clerks. His estimate of the RCIA was correct in that the president had too much power, but Suffridge always used that power for the benefit of the members.

JAMES SUFFRIDGE
Scope and Content Note: Was ideologically far removed from Meyers and would sometimes pull rank. He was, however, what the union needed because, in order to do the job of organizing, the union needed strong leadership and no internal politics.

CLEVELAND AND PETER FORMICA (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Formica was very popular in Cleveland. He was deserving of more recognition than he received, especially considering the quality of the Executive Board in the 1940s. The Cleveland Central Labor Council was “a crooked group.” The Teamsters offered Formica and his followers direct affiliation, and the AMC&BW were solidly behind Formica also. The Teamsters, Formica's people and the Meat Cutters tried to intimidate Meyers and the RCIA representatives when they came in to save the RCIA locals in Formica's area. Meyers lost one small group in the fight because the opposition treated them to drinks after a meeting at which Meyers thought he had convinced them to remain with RCIA. The RCIA appealed to Dan Tobin, Teamsters' President, to get his Cleveland Teamsters to stop interfering. No appeal to Gorman was thought worthwhile. In an attempted peace meeting with Tobin, William Finnegan, Secretary of the Central Labor Council, was called as a character witness, and he proclaimed, “I ain't doin' nuthin against no Teamsters. The Teamsters done everything for me....” The Central Labor Council ran headlines supporting Formica. Anecdote about mix-up over telegram, written by Meyers over A.F.L. President William Green's signature, in support of the RCIA cause. Meyers had to run to the RCIA convention in order to get permission from Suffridge to spend money advertising the telegram. Green, however, was unaware of the telegram, and the opposition tried to advertise that fact. Meyers was able to save the situation by a last-minute visit to Green.

THE FORMICA SITUATION WAS AS CLOSE TO INTERNAL POLITICS AS THE RCIA EXPERIENCED DURING SUFFRIDGE'S ADMINISTRATION
Scope and Content Note: Formica was gathering Catholic leadership around the country “to plan a capture of the International for the Mother Church.” While there were several corrupt officials in RCIA in need of cleansing, Suffridge probably started with Formica because of this political scheme. Before going into Ohio, Meyers visited Formica's political allies in Catholic Boston to forewarn them about what was to happen. Meyers had just replaced Irishman Edward Shay as Division Director. Shay “had watched the Division fall apart.” The Boston people had nothing against Meyers, but admitted they wanted to get rid of Suffridge and Housewright. Meyers told them to save it for when there was an election.

FORMICA'S LOT WAS UNFORTUNATE
Scope and Content Note: Had the RCIA been strong and unified, Formica would not have had to get mixed up with the corrupt elements of the Cleveland labor movement.

MORE ON THE CLEANSING OF THE CLEVELAND AREA (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: With most of organized labor in the area arrayed against the RCIA, things got to a point where Meyers had to call in the entire organizing staff. Meyers guaranteed jobs to any local person who remained loyal to the International. Over the years, many called him on this promise, and he has always delivered. One strategy Meyers used was to reduce the dues by edict and have the organizers sign people up on the same card that announced the dues' reduction. Meyers held nightly mass meetings and told the people they were ten dollars behind the usual scale. When they went into negotiations, Meyers had a hard time convincing management they should offer more than the usual two dollars and then convincing the members they ought to accept the five dollars offered. The issue of back pay caused some hard feelings with management because the union's mailing list was more complete than Meyers had told management negotiators.

FORMICA'S LETTER OF CONFESSION
Scope and Content Note: Everything in the letter was true. One salary, one source for expenses, and absolute honesty constituted Suffridge's union religion. Formica hoped the confession would provide him mercy or consideration. Suffridge told him it would be considered, but it is questionable whether it ever was.

WALT DAVIS
Scope and Content Note: Ironically, Davis, who now heads a UFCW department, worked for the Cleveland Central Labor Council at the time of the Formica situation and was writing material against Meyers and the RCIA.^[2]

RCIA AND THE TEAMSTERS, DAVE BECK AND SEATTLE, 1948 (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: All RCIA business agents and officers in Seattle were appointed by Beck. He was inviting clerks from California to attend his western conferences. Beck was the call-in man for management. He was management's representative on the labor side. Nathan Shefferman was Beck's close associate. Beck was in the pay of management.

ANECDOTE ABOUT BECK AND SUFFRIDGE IN 1942
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge manufactured a strike in order to get a wage increase before expected wage controls were instituted at the beginning of World War II. When Suffridge was with Safeway in San Francisco, he found Beck in the office of the company. Beck said he was there to help management. Suffridge threw him out.^[3]

MORE ON SEATTLE, 1948 (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Beck's attempt to force clerks to scab on striking machinists precipitated the RCIA's confrontation with him. Meyers had his hands full in New York and Denver and would just as soon have avoided the situation. Meyers took all western organizers and several western local officers to Seattle.

MORE ON SEATTLE, 1948 (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: A membership meeting gave Meyers thunderous applause when he declared the members were “no longer at the Beck and call of any outsiders.” Meyers had to go outside the state of Washington to find an auditor who dared inspect the local books. He found Beck was using RCIA credit cards and charging Clerks a heavy per capita tax. Furthermore, he regularly settled for a nickel at negotiations, thus forcing the clean Tacoma local to strike for every raise. One of Beck's henchmen later became an RCIA vice-president. Beck even controlled a federal judge. During that period, Beck's picture appeared on the cover of Time with an article claiming he would soon become head of the AFL, and that he had just caused the appointment of President Truman's Secretary of Labor, L. Schwellenbach. Teamster President Tobin finally intervened to get Beck to sit down with Meyers, but Beck insisted on unacceptable conditions for the meeting. After three months, Beck could no longer take the constant pressure and publicity RCIA was applying. Meyers and Beck met in Tobin's office and reached a satisfactory agreement, though Beck later claimed he had the right of approval over any RCIA director appointed for the area. One of the first things Meyers had done when he arrived in Seattle was to lease a building in order to separate the Clerks from Beck's offices. Part of the agreement with Beck and Tobin was that the Clerks would remain in the Teamsters' building until their lease had expired. Because Beck was so influential in Seattle real estate, Meyers was unable to sublease the new building and had to pay rent on it for five years.

RCIA - TEAMSTERS RELATIONS ELSEWHERE; DENVER AND THE MAY COMPANY STRIKE (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Beck was so angry with his defeat in Seattle he put out an edict that RCIA picket lines were not to be observed, even though Clerks and Teamsters had very good relations in many cities. Denver Teamsters had militantly supported the May Company strike for six months. With tears in their eyes, local Teamster leaders then came to Meyers and reported that Tobin and Beck had ordered them to break the picket lines; to deliver to the May Company. If they failed to do so, they would be placed under supervision and lose their jobs. The building trades rose to the occasion, surrounding the May Company pickets with 14 building trades' picket lines. The word went out that, if the Teamsters tried to break the picket line, the building trades would take over the Teamsters in Denver before Beck could and would retain the local, honest officials. It worked; Tobin and Beck were forced to back off. The Teamsters continued to respect the picket lines for the remaining two months of the strike.

POLICE AND RAILROAD UNIONS AND THE DENVER MAY COMPANY STRIKE (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Supplies were being delivered to the May Company warehouse by rail at 3 a.m. The women strikers laid on the railroad tracks to stop the trains. The police picked them up from the tracks and set them down, and the women would immediately return to the tracks. In the morning, Meyers got in touch with executives of the railroad brotherhoods, who came to Denver. They decided the situation was too dangerous for their members and ordered them to deliver no more cars to the warehouse.

CONCLUSION OF THE MAY COMPANY STRIKE (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Finally, May Company officials from Cleveland came to Denver, accompanied by Einar Mohn, a Teamster associate of Beck and later a Teamster vice-president. Meyers refused to negotiate while Mohn was present. The Secretary of the Building Trades Council in Denver physically removed Mohn from the room but then secretly asked Meyers to settle if possible because the building trades themselves were facing a tough strike in two weeks. The strike had been precipitated when the company offered twenty-four dollars, and the union insisted on twenty-six dollars. Now Meyers demanded thirty dollars because of the rapid rise in the cost of living during the eight months of the strike.

MORE ON CONCLUSION 0F MAY COMPANY STRIKE (“Recollections”)
Scope and Content Note: Thirty-six hours of continual negotiations. Got everything but a union shop but did get a modified union shop. The situation, however, deteriorated after that because the local hired a weak business agent. Also, the International, tired of dumping money into the situation, agreed to holding an election in the store rather than at the post office as Meyers had wanted. The election, as a result, was lost by a small margin.^[4]

END OF TAPE 8, SIDE 1 (at 05:25) and END OF NOVEMBER 20, 1980, SESSION
Note: The tape sounds like Meyers had more to say, but the interview had ended, and Meyers was merely preparing to play a tape he had had Walt Davis make for his grandchildren.